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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

V.

:

JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 950759-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction entered
upon a plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1995) .
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1.

Was the post-plea hearing at which defendant was

committed to the Department of Corrections for a 60-day
diagnostic evaluation a "critical stage" for the purposes of
defendant's right to the presence of counsel?

This issue presents a question of law which this Court
reviews for correctness.

State v. Martinez. 896 P.2d 38, 39-40

(Utah App. 1995)(questions of constitutional law are reviewed for
correctness); State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah App.
1993) (whether a fundamental violation of a defendant's rights
was implicated is a question of law reviewed for correctness).
2(A).

Did the sentencing court's failure to appoint

new counsel for the remainder of the May hearing render its
actions "inherently unfair" and warrant resentencing?
2(B).

Did the sentencing court consider both the

suitability of the correctional program offered by Parkview
Community Correctional Center and the difference between
defendant's and the victim's version of the offense?
This Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal
u

"unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to

consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits.'"

State v. Wright, 893 P.2d

1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v, Nuttall, 861 P.2d
454, 457 (Utah App. 1993)).

To find an abuse of discretion, this

Court must determine that u'no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the trial court.'"

Wright. 893 P.2d at 1120

(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
2

An

abuse of discretion may occur where the judge's sentencing
actions were "inherently unfair" or where the sentence imposed
was wclearly excessive". Wright. 893 P.2d at 1120.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1995)/ aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995); and possession of
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) (R. 10-11).

Pursuant to plea

negotiations, she entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery, a
first degree felony, on April 11, 1995, in exchange for dismissal
of the remaining counts (R. 16). The matter was set for
sentencing on May 23, 1995, to allow for preparation of a
presentence investigation report (R. 16).
Although May 23 was initially scheduled as the
sentencing hearing, the lower court made no effort to sentence
defendant on that date.

Instead, the court began the hearing by
3

informing defendant and her counsel that he would be sending
defendant for a diagnostic evaluation to see if there were
appropriate alternatives to prison (R. 47). Addendum A.

Defense

counsel then informed the court that defendant had just told him
that she had filed a bar complaint against him (R. 21, 47).
Addendum A.

Counsel moved to withdraw due to the conflict,

informing the court that Don Redd handled all conflict cases (R.
21, 47-48).

Addendum A.

The trial court granted counsel's

motion, then explained that the presentence report recommended
imprisonment, but the court needed more information before it
could make a final sentencing determination (R. 21-23, 48-49).
Addendum A.

Consequently, the court committed defendant to the

Department of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic evaluation
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995), explained that the
court would have Mr. Redd contact the appropriate person "at the
diagnostic[,]" and continued sentencing until July 25, 1995 (R.
20-23, 49-51).

Addendum A.

Defendant's conflict counsel, Don Redd, appeared with
her at the July 25 sentencing hearing, and both counsel and
defendant addressed the court on defendant's behalf (R. 24, 6367).

Addendum B.

The court then sentenced defendant to the Utah

State Prison for an indeterminate term of five-years-to-life,
4

plus a fine and a surcharge (R. 24, 25-26, 27, 29-30, 66) .
Addendum B.

Defendant challenges her sentence on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Because the issues on appeal involve procedure and
sentencing, a detailed statement of facts is unnecessary.
In 1995, defendant and her nephew, Epifino Chavez, took
a handgun and went to the victim's home to collect money for a
car defendant had left with the victim to sell (R. 10-11;
Presentence Investigation Report [hereinafter nPSR"] at p. 2).
When the victim claimed to have no money, Chavez pulled the gun
and threatened the victim (R. 11; PSR at p. 2). Defendant then
took the gun from Chavez, pointed it at the victim, and
threatened him (R. 11; PSR at p. 2). Defendant and Chavez took a
leather jacket and a hunting knife and sheath belonging to the
victim, then forced the victim at gunpoint to leave his apartment
and go to defendant's car (R. 12; PSR at p. 2). The victim
escaped and called the police (R. 12; PSR at p. 2). Defendant
and Chavez fled, and were captured later in Sunset, Utah (R. 12;
PSR at p. 2). The victim's property was found in defendant's

5

car, and the loaded weapon was recovered from where it had been
thrown after defendant and Chavez had fled (R. 12; PSR at p. 2) ^
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant argues that she was deprived of her
constitutional right to the presence of counsel at her May 23
sentencing.

The record shows that, at the hearing on May 23,

1995, defendant informed her counsel of her bar complaint against
him, counsel was permitted to withdraw, conflict counsel
automatically assumed the case, and, in conflict counsel's
absence, the court committed defendant for a 60-day diagnostic
evaluation, then continued sentencing to July.

Under the

specific facts at hand, the May hearing was not a "critical
stage" of the proceedings for purposes of the presence of
counsel, and there was no risk that conflict counsel's absence at
the May hearing could derogate from defendant's right to a fair
sentencing in July.

Sentencing did not occur at the May hearing,

defendant received an opportunity via the diagnostic evaluation
to avoid prison, and both defendant and her conflict counsel had

defendant claims that she did not pull the gun out and
threaten the victim. Instead, she claims that she had the
unloaded gun in her pocket at all times, and that the victim saw
it in her pocket (R. 41-42, 66-67). Addendum B. As noted by the
court at the change of plea hearing, even defendant's version of
the incident supports her conviction (R. 41-42) .
6

the full opportunity to make all arguments and appeals to the
sentencing court at the July sentencing hearing.

Hence, the

absence of conflict counsel at the May hearing neither violated
defendant's basic right to a fair sentencing nor adversely
affected her participation in sentencing.

Further, the court's

failure to postpone defendant's commitment for the evaluation
until conflict counsel was physically present did not rise to the
level of inherent unfairness so as to warrant resentencing.
Point II: Defendant's claim that, at the sentencing
hearing in July, the lower court failed to consider the
sentencing alternative presented by Parkview Community
Correctional Center is contrary to the record.

The diagnostic

evaluation report clearly reflects Parkview's acceptance of
defendant and rejects Parkview in favor of the program available
in the state prison.

Defendant fails to establish error in the

trial court's reliance on the report's evaluation of the
sentencing alternatives.

Hence, the sentencing court necessarily

considered the Parkview alternative in accepting the report's
recommendation, and defendant's claim fails.
Defendant's claim that the sentencing court was
required to determine which of conflicting versions of the facts
underlying the offense was the more credible is without legal
7

support.

The fact that the victim's version of the offense

differed from defendant's does not create an inaccuracy which, by
statute, the court is permitted but not required to correct.
Neither is the court required to make credibility determinations
before sentencing.

Both versions were adequately reflected in

the written reports given to the court, and defendant does not
establish that either the recommendations or the court's decision
were based on her failure to conform her version to the victim's
version.

Hence, the court's inaction does not require reversal

of the sentence.

MOTMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING WHERE DEFENDANT
WAS MERELY COMMITTED FOR A DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION IN THE
ABSENCE OF CONFLICT COUNSEL, NO SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED AT
THE CHALLENGED HEARING, AND THE HEARING WAS NOT A
"CRITICAL STAGE" OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant contends that she was denied her
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at sentencing.
Specifically, she claims that when she appeared for sentencing on
May 23, 1995, the trial court first granted her counsel's verbal
motion to withdraw, then, without appointing new counsel,
proceeded to "sentence" her to the custody of the Department of

8

Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic evaluation.

Br. of App. at

19-24. She argues that the trial court's failure to immediately
appoint new counsel for the remainder of the hearing or to get
defendant's waiver of her right to counsel constituted a denial
of the right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings,
prevented her from presenting her case in mitigation of
sentencing, and requires that her sentence be vacated.

Id.

Moreover, she argues that the trial court's actions constituted
plain error and exceptional circumstances, thereby excusing her
failure to raise this issue below.

Id. at 17-19.

Finally, she

contends that the court's action was so inherently unfair as to
constitute an abuse of discretion and warrant reversal of the
sentence.

Id. at 25.

A T The Court's Failure t<? Sua Sponte Continue the May Hearing
Until Defendant's Conflict Counsel Could be Physically Present
does not Amount to Plain Error or an Abuse of Discretion
This Court will not disturb a sentence on appeal unless
the trial court has abused its discretion.

State v. Wright. 893

P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995) . To find an abuse of
discretion, this Court must determine that "xno reasonable
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.'"
Wright, 893 P.2d at 1120 (quoting State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978)).

An abuse of discretion may occur where the
9

judge's sentencing actions were "inherently unfair". Wright, 893
P.2d at 1120.
Additionally, defendant's assertion of error requires
that she prove that 1) an error occurred; 2) the error was
obvious; and 3) the error was harmful.

State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d

856, 861 (Utah 1995).
If the May hearing at issue here had involved the
pronouncement and imposition of defendant's sentence, this Court
would be faced with a "critical stage" at which the absence of
counsel generally would constitute an error not subject to a
harmlessness analysis.

See Wagstaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 776

(Utah App. 1990) (and cases cited therein). However, not only was
defendant not sentenced at the May hearing, but the court
necessarily appointed conflict counsel and continued sentencing
for two months in order to obtain a diagnostic evaluation report.
Consequently, a more precise statement of the issue is whether
the lower court committed plain error by failing to, sua sponte.
refrain from committing defendant for the diagnostic evaluation
until such time as conflict counsel could be physically present.
Although, arguably, it would have been easy and preferable for
the court to continue the hearing simply to have conflict counsel

10

present, the court's failure to do so does not rise to the level
of plain error.
The facts of the May hearing bear careful review.2

As

the hearing began, defendant was represented by her original
appointed counsel (R. 46-47).

Addendum A.

The court's first

statement to the parties informed them that it intended to "send
[defendant] down to diagnostic and have an evaluation before
commitment to the prison to determine if that's appropriate or if
there's other programs" (R. 47). Addendum A.
f

Thus, the court's

intent was clear from the beginning of the hearing.

Only then

did defense counsel inform the court of defendant's bar complaint
against him, identify Don Redd as conflict counsel, then move to
withdraw from the case (R. 21, 47-48).
respectively.

Addenda C and A,

When conflict counsel becomes necessary, the

2

It appears that the transcript of the May hearing may be
incomplete. Defendant's brief reflects that defense counsel
u
interrupted" the trial court during the May hearing to seek
withdrawal. Br. of App. at 7-8. However, the transcript
essentially begins with defense counsel's "interruption" (R. 47).
Addendum A. Counsel told the court that defendant informed him
of the bar complaint that morning "after we took the break" (R.
47). Addendum A. No break is reflected in the transcript.
Further, counsel stated to the court that defendant told him for
the first time that day "that she wanted to change her plea[] and
£§ I put QXl the record eflrlisr, I notified her that she did miss
the 3 0 days." (R. 47-48) (emphasis added). Addendum A. No such
comment is reflected earlier in the transcript.
11

courts necessarily appoint the individual or firm who has the
contract with the county.

The court's understanding of this was

demonstrated by its representation that it would have Mr. Redd
contact the Department of Corrections (R. 51). Addendum A.
Accordingly, conflict counsel was necessarily appointed, and the
motion to withdraw was granted (R. 21, 48) . Addenda C and A,
respectively.
Immediately thereafter, in the brief span of time in
which Mr. Redd was not physically present with defendant, the
court explained to defendant that it was committing her to the
custody of the Department of Corrections for a 60-day diagnostic
evaluation in order to have more information about possible
sentencing alternatives, noting that the presentence report
recommended imprisonment and the court needed more information to
determine whether something besides imprisonment might be
appropriate (R. 49). Addendum A.

The court then continued

sentencing to July 25, 1995, and ended the hearing (R. 51).
Addendum A.
The court easily could have stopped the hearing after
granting the motion to withdraw and reset it for a time when Mr.
Redd could be physically in the courtroom.

However, no purpose

would have been served by such action under the facts of this
12

case.

The court made it clear that defendant would either have

the evaluation done or be sentenced to prison, and that he would
not release her pending any further action in the case (R. 47,
49-50) . Addendum A.

The decision to send a defendant for a

diagnostic evaluation is totally within the discretion of the
sentencing court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404 (1995).
Addendum D. The evaluation provides defendant with an opportunity
to avoid imprisonment, which she requested of the court below (R.
65).

Addendum B.

A delay of the proceedings to await counsel's

presence would have served no purpose except to delay either the
evaluation or the sentence of imprisonment.
Defendant complains that if she had the benefit of
counsel at the May hearing, she would have been in a position to
''marshal [] commendations and arguments in mitigation of the
impending sentenced imposed."

Br. of App. at 21. Such

presentations were not sought by the court at the May hearing,
and would have been premature where the court was not imposing
sentence.

Further, defendant's new counsel did not thereafter

object to any lost opportunity to present arguments in mitigation
of sentencing, but was given the opportunity to provide any
argument he saw fit at the July sentencing hearing.

Hence, it

was not obvious, even to defendant's own counsel, that his
13

failure to be physically present when defendant was committed for
the evaluation prevented her from presenting her case in
mitigation of sentencing.

Where defendant had conflict counsel

appointed at the May hearing, received a chance to avoid prison,
then had full benefit of counsel at the July sentencing hearing,
the harm she identifies did not occur, and the court's failure to
postpone the evaluation until conflict counsel could physically
appear with defendant did not constitute obvious error or
inherent unfairness.

ILi The May Hearing w^s not a Critical Stage for Purposes of the
Assistance of Counsel
Defendant's characterization of the May hearing as a
"sentencing" hearing, and her use of cases proclaiming that
sentencing is a "critical stage" for purposes of the right to the
presence of counsel, is misleading.

The May hearing, originally

scheduled for sentencing to coincide with the completion of the
presentence investigation report, was not a sentencing hearing
because no sentence was imposed; instead, sentencing was
continued for two months.
There appears to be no authority involving the precise
situation before this Court.

However, under existing authority,

14

the May hearing does not qualify as a "critical stage" warranting
reversal because of defense counsel's absence.
In the context of criminal proceedings, a "critical
stage" is a point at which the assistance of counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial. See
State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 785 n.25 (Utah 1980); Cavaness
v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 354 (Utah 1979); see also Coleman v.
Alabama. 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 2003 (1969) (whether a
preliminary hearing is a critical stage "depends. . . upon an
analysis [of] 'whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendant's rights inhere [s] in the . . . confrontation . . .
. " ) ; United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926,
1931 (1967) (a critical stage is a stage "where the results might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality.").

The concept applies to sentencing as well.

Kuehnert V, Turner, 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972).

Part of

the rationale is the need to have counsel present to give
defendant an opportunity to present to the court facts in
extenuation of sentencing or in explanation of defendant's
conduct, to correct any mistakes in the reports or other
information upon which the court will rely, and "to appeal to the
equity of the court in its administration and enforcement of
15

penal laws.*

Kuehnert. 499 P.2d at 840-41; see also State v.

Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (emphasizing the
importance of correcting errors at the time of sentencing in
order to obtain a fair proceeding).
However, not every point in the criminal process
constitutes a "critical stage" for purposes of the right to the
presence of counsel.

For example, the United States Supreme

Court has recognized a distinction between a critical stage and
the preparatory steps taken by the prosecution to gather
evidence, e.g., conducting a lineup or taking and analyzing the
accused's fingerprints or blood sample. Wade. 388 U.S. at 227,
87 S.Ct. at 1232-33 (recognizing that such preparatory steps are
not "critical stages" at which the right to the presence of
counsel is required), cited with approval in £avail£5£, 598 P.2d
at 353. Because, in these instances, the availability and
uniformity of scientific techniques give a defendant "the
opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [prosecution's]
case at trial through the ordinary process of cross-examination
of the [prosecution's] expert witnesses and the presentation of
the evidence of his own experts[,]" such preparatory steps
involve "minimal risk" that defense counsel's absence at such

16

stages might derogate from defendant's right to a fair trial.
Wade 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1933.
The same rationale applies in this sentencing context.
Although defendant may have anticipated that she would be
sentenced on May 23, sentencing was continued to allow for
preparation of the diagnostic evaluation.

The only thing done at

the May hearing in conflict counsel's absence was the preparatory
step of submitting defendant for the 60-day diagnostic evaluation
in order to provide the court with more information and possible
alternatives to incarceration so that the court could make an
informed sentencing decision (R. 48-51).3

Addendum A.

The

diagnostic evaluation was done at the discretion of the trial
court for an appropriate purpose, and defendant had no right to
refuse to submit to the evaluation.
(1995); Addendum E.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404

Once all the information sought by the court

3

That the lower court only committed defendant for the
evaluation and intended that sentencing be continued to July is
clear from the record, despite the court's use of language more
appropriate to sentencing. R. 49, Addendum A (court says it
"sentence[s] [defendant] to the department of corrections for a
60-day evaluation"); R. 22, Addendum D (written order states
"There being no legal reason presented to the Court why judgment
should not be pronounced . . . n ) . The court's actions at the
May hearing were to commit defendant for the evaluation and
continue sentencing to July when all the necessary information
would be before the court, and the language in the written order
makes it clear that the court harbored no other intent.
17

was available in July, defendant was given full opportunity for
meaningful presentation of any arguments in mitigation or
clarification of the diagnostic evaluation and the preliminary
report, as well as in mitigation of sentence.4

Both defendant

and her counsel were permitted to make whatever arguments they
chose, and defendant has not identified any arguments counsel
might have made at the May hearing which were not available at
the July hearing.

Where only the commitment for evaluation

occurred in conflict counsel's absence at the May hearing, the
commitment was merely preparatory to sentencing, and defendant
had full opportunity to provide mitigating arguments or correct
the sentencing information at the July sentencing hearing, there
was no risk that counsel's absence could derogate from
defendant's right to a fair sentencing.

Wade, 388 U.S. at 227,

87 S.Ct. at 1933.
Moreover, nothing occurred or was said at the May
hearing in the absence of counsel which could have impacted on

4

At the July hearing, both defense counsel and defendant
addressed the court and had full opportunity to "marshal[ ]
commendations and arguments in mitigation of the impending
sentence" and to "challengte] any discrepancies in the
Presentence Investigation Report" (R. 63-68; Addendum B). Br. of
App. at 21-22. Defendant does not challenge in this appeal her
new counsel's performance at the July hearing.
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the July sentencing hearing, and nothing in the July hearing
suggested that the trial court was in any way influenced by
anything which occurred at the May hearing.

The hearings

involved different conduct, and no mention was made at either
hearing of anything that occurred at the other hearing.
Consequently, not only was the May hearing not a "critical stage"
requiring the presence of defense counsel, but there was no error
in ordering the evaluation in the absence of conflict counsel,
and there was no involvement of a constitutional right so basic
to a fair trial that the court's failure to suspend the hearing
was necessarily harmful.

Cavaness, 598 P.2d at 353-54; State v.

Codianna. 573 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1977) (the absence of defendant
and his counsel from an in-chambers hearing was harmless error).
Defendant relies on two cases which illustrate that a
trial court may commit error when it sentences a defendant
without the presence of an advocate speaking on his behalf. Brief
of App. at 22-23.

Both involve defendants who were actually

sentenced by the courts to prison terms without representation by
counsel at the time of sentencing.

United States v. Daniels, 558

F.2d 122, 125, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1977) (at the sentencing hearing,
defendant sought new counsel, and "for all practical purposes"
acted without counsel for the rest of the hearing, at which he
19

was sentenced); Williams v. State. 600 So.2d 524 (Fla. App.
1992)(at the sentencing hearing, counsel was dismissed on
defendant's motion, defendant's request for new counsel was
denied, and sentence was imposed).

Because the May hearing in

this case did not constitute a "critical stage" but merely served
the preparatory purpose of permitting the sentencing judge to
obtain evidence necessary to the ultimate sentencing decision,
with another opportunity provided for defendant to present
evidence and argument in mitigation of sentence, defendant's
cases are easily distinguished.
Under the specific facts surrounding the May hearing,
the lower court did not commit error in failing to suspending the
proceedings pending named conflict counsel's physical presence.
Neither was the court's action in giving defendant the potential
benefit of a diagnostic evaluation in the absence of conflict
counsel's presence so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse
of discretion. Consequently, both defendant's plain error and
exceptional circumstances arguments necessarily fail.

See State

v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 862 (Utah 1995) (defendant's plain error
argument fails where he fails to establish error); State v.
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 904 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant's arguments
fail where he does not establish either error or sufficiently
20

exceptional circumstances to warrant deviating from the general
waiver doctrine).5

PQINT II
THE SENTENCING COURT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED BOTH AN
ALTERNATIVE INPATIENT PROGRAM AND THE DIFFERING
VERSIONS OF THE OFFENSE IN MAKING ITS SENTENCING
DETERMINATION; ITS FAILURE TO MAKE UNNECESSARY
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL OF
THE SENTENCE
On July 25, 1995, the lower court heard argument and
imposed sentence upon defendant.

Defendant contends that the

court failed to consider two legally relevant sentencing factors
mentioned by defendant at the July sentencing hearing, thereby
warranting reversal of her sentence.

Br. of App. at 28-29.

A sentence may be subject to remand on appeal where a
trial court fails to consider all legally relevant factors in
imposing sentence.

State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah

App. 1995) .
First, defendant argues that the lower court did not
take the time to determine whether Parkview Community

defendant's argument ends with a claim that the trial court
breached its duty to "inquire" into appointing new counsel before
proceeding further with the May hearing, as well as a duty to
continue the hearing until counsel appeared. Br. of App. at 24.
These claims go to the heart of her main argument and do not
assert additional grounds upon which to argue for reversal of her
sentence.
21

Correctional Center offered a long-term program suitable for her
needs.

Br. of App. at 28. However, the sentencing court

factored Parkview into its sentencing decision, both from its own
knowledge of Parkview and from the diagnostic evaluation.

In the

course of the 60-day evaluation process, an application was
submitted to Parkview on defendant's behalf, and Parkview
tentatively accepted defendant into their program (R. 64-65;
Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4 ) . Addendum B.

At the July

sentencing hearing, defense counsel emphasized the acceptance,
although counsel was under the mistaken impression that the
acceptance was not reflected in the evaluation report (R. 64-65).
Addendum B.

The report not only noted Parkview's acceptance of

defendant, but went on to recommend, in spite of that acceptance,
that the long-term residential treatment program, which was
strongly recommended for defendant by the psychologist, could
best be found at the Utah State Prison, which also offered "an
excellent mental health and drug abuse therapy program" to meet
defendant's requests for such programs (Diagnostic Evaluation
Report, pp. 2, 4 ) . The sentencing court noted its familiarity
with Parkview and its belief that the program was not
sufficiently long-term, as was recommended in the evaluation
report (R. 65-66).

Addendum B.

The court then chose to follow
22

the recommendation of the Department of Corrections that the
prison's program was better for defendant (R. 66; Diagnostic
Evaluation Report, pp. 4-5) . Addendum B.

Defendant does not

establish that the court's memory of Parkview's program was
erroneous in any respect, that, upon further inquiry, the court
would have found Parkview more suitable for her than the prison's
program, or that the court cannot rely on the Department of
Correction's evaluation of Parkview's program.

In light of the

evaluation report's recognition, consideration and rejection of
Parkview's program, the court necessarily factored Parkview into
its sentencing decision, and its failure to look further into the
program does not warrant reversal of the sentence.
Second, defendant claims that the court failed to
follow the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) (Supp.
1995) to clarify what defendant calls a ''discrepancy" in the
written reports.

Br. of App. at 28-29.

Section 77-18-1(6)(a)

reads:
(a) . . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the
presentence investigation report, which have not been
resolved by the parties and the department prior to
sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional
ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of
the report with the department. If after ten working
days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court

23

shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record•
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) (Supp. 1995).

Addendum F.

The official reports of the offense to which defendant
entered a plea reflect that defendant held a gun to the victim's
head and threatened to shoot him (Diagnostic Evaluation Report,
p. 4; PSR, pp. 2-3) . Defendant has repeatedly denied these
actions (R. 41-42, 66-67; Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4;
PSR, p. 3). Immediately after the court pronounced sentence
below, defense counsel argued that if defendant's refusal to
admit doing something she did not do affects her progress in the
treatment program, he was not sure what to do about it (R. 6667).

Addendum B.

The trial court responded to the concern by

telling counsel to write to the "program people" to explain his
dilemma (R. 67). Addendum B.
As a threshold matter, the argument on appeal--that a
determination of which version is true is necessary to the
sentencing determination--was not raised below and, therefore, is
not properly before this Court.

State v. Pilling. 875 P.2d 604,

606 (Utah App. 1994) (requiring specific preservation of claim of
error before trial court).

Defense counsel's narrow comment

below did not tie his concern to the sentencing decision, and the

24

trial court answered in kind.

Defendant argues neither plain

error nor deficient performance to excuse her failure to
adequately preserve this point below.
need not reach this claim on appeal.

Accordingly, this Court
Id,: State v. Jennings. 875

P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994) (defendant must argue plain error
before this Court will consider the doctrine); State v.
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992) (defendant must
argue plain error and exceptional circumstances before this Court
will undertake a review of these claims).
Even on its merits, the claim fails because there is no
inaccuracy in the reports to be settled.

The statute permits the

court to correct inaccurate information, not differing points of
view, and does not require that the court do so. Defendant has
identified a discrepancy or disagreement as to the facts of the
crime, and both the presentence report and the diagnostic
evaluation accurately reflect both versions of the incident
(Diagnostic Evaluation Report, p. 4; PSR, pp. 2-3). Defendant
makes no attempt to establish that the recommendations in either
report were based on her refusal to admit that she pulled a gun
and pointed it at the victim, nor does she explain why a
determination of which version is correct is "critical" to

25

imposition of her sentence, where both versions support her
conviction for aggravated robbery.

Br. of App. at 29.

Because no inaccuracy exists, and the trial court was
presented with both versions of the events and necessarily took
them both into account in imposing sentence, the court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to make a credibility
determination to support only one version, and defendant's
sentence should be affirmed.

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's sentence.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: NO PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State believes that oral argument would be
beneficial in this case.

However, the State does not feel that a

published opinion is necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Cv?7 ^day of April, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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1
2
3

STATE OF UTAH VERSUS JESSIE MARTINEZ.

4

MR. ALBRIGHT:

5

THE COURT:

YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY.

LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I'M WILLING

6

TO DO IN THIS CASE.

7

DOWN TO DIAGNOSTIC AND HAVE AN EVALUATION BEFORE

8

COMMITMENT TO THE PRISON TO DETERMINE IF THAT'S

9

APPROPRIATE OR IF THERE'S OTHER PROGRAMS.

10

HAVING REVIEWED THIS, SEND HER

MR. ALBRIGHT:

YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE GO

11

FURTHER, IN TALKING WITH MISS MARTINEZ, SHE HAS

12

INFORMED ME THAT SHE HAS FILED A COMPLAINT AT THE BAR

13

AGAINST MYSELF.

14

HER.

15

REPRESENTS THE CO-DEFENDANT IN THIS MATTER AND SO IS

16

UNABLE TO HANDLE THE SENTENCING AS WELL.

17

WITH MEL WILSON TODAY AND DON REDD IS THE ATTORNEY THAT]

18

WILL NOW HANDLE CONFLICT CASES.

19

THE COURT:

20
21

TODAY.

BASED ON THAT, I CANNOT REPRESENT

OBVIOUSLY THAT'S A CONFLICT.

MR. CELLA

I'VE TALKED

SO WE NEED HER --.

BUT I'M NOT GOING TO RELEASE HER

I'M NOT GOING TO RELEASE HER WHILE WE WAIT.
MR. ALBRIGHT:

I CAN'T REPRRESENT HER AND I'M|

22

NOT REPRESENTING HER AT THIS TIME.

AS I SAID, SHE JUST

23

LET ME KNOW TODAY AFTER WE TOOK THE BREAK.

24

HAVE GIVEN HER COPIES OF THE REPORT.

25

POSSESSION RIGHT NOW.

SO -- AND I

SHE HAS IT IN HER

AND FOR THE RECORD, ALSO TODAY

2

1

WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT SHE INFORMED ME THAT SHE WANTED

2

TO CHANGE HER PLEA. AND AS I PUT ON THE RECORD EARLIER,

3

I NOTIFIED HER THAT SHE DID MISS THE 30 DAYS.

4

HAD MISSED THE 3 0 DAYS TODAY.

5

PHONE MESSAGES FROM MISS MARTINEZ SINCE APRIL WHEN WE

6

WERE HERE AND TODAY'S THE FIRST TIME I'VE HAD THAT

7

INFORMATION GIVEN TO ME.

8

REDD NEEDS TO BE INFORMED THAT HE'S GOING TO BE

9

REPRESENTING HER AND SHE NEEDS TO TAKE THE PRE-SENTENCE

THAT SHE

I'VE NOT RECEIVED ANY

SO MY FEELING IS THAT DON

10

REPORT THAT SHE HAS OR HE NEEDS TO ACQUIRE ONE BEFORE

11

SHE IS SENTENCED.

12

I MAKE A FORMAL MOTION AT THIS TIME TO

13

WITHDRAW FROM THE CASE ON THE CONFLICT THAT I HAVE ON

14

THE RECORD.

15
16

THE COURT:

OKAY.

THE COURT WILL GRANT YOUR

MOTION.

17

MS. MARTINEZ:

I DID TRY CALLING HIM.

18

CALL ME BACK COLLECT.

19

AND LEFT A MESSAGE.

20

PLEASE DO NOT CALL ME BACK COLLECT.

21

ME BACK.

22

HE DID

AND I DID CALL HIM BACK AGAIN
I TOLD HIM, PLEASE CALL ME.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

HE NEVER DID CALL

THAT WAS IN ANOTHER MATTER.

23

SHE DIDN'T BRING UP ANYTHING ABOUT THE APPEAL.

24

INVOLVED -- SHE DIDN'T WANT TO COME TO COURT FOR

25

SENTENCING.

SHE WANTED A CONTINUANCE.

THAT

IS THAT RIGHT?

\Xb

1
2

MS. MARTINEZ:

YES.

I ALSO DIDN'T -- WANTED

TO SPEAK TO YOU SOMEMORE.

3

MR. ALBRIGHT:

I DIDN'T TALK TO HER ANY

4

MORE.

5

TO HER AND TOLD THAT SHE WAS TO COME TO COURT.

6

THERE WAS NOTHING FOR ME TO DISCUSS ON THAT SUBJECT.

7

SHE PHONED ME, AS SHE DID STATE.

8

TO HER ON THAT DAY.

9

I TALKED TO YOUR CLERK AND YOUR CLERK HAD TALKED
SO

HOWEVER, I DID TALK

WE DID COMMUNICATE.

THE COURT:

MS. MARTINEZ, THIS IS THE TIME

10

SET FOR SENTENCING. THE RECOMMENDATION

11

SENTENCED TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON FIVE YEARS TO LIFE.

12

I BELIEVE THAT I

13

PROPOSING IS SENTENCE YOU TO THE DEPARTMENT OF

14

CORRECTIONS FOR A 60-DAY EVALUATION.

15

THEY DETERMINE YOUR BACKGROUND AND MAKE A

16

RECOMMENDATION

17

RECOMMENDATION OR THAT YOU SHOULD BE IN SOME

18

ALTERNATIVE

19
20

IS THAT YOU BE

DO NEED MORE INFORMATION AND WHAT I'M

IN THE EVALUATION)

IF YOU SHOULD -- IF I SHOULD FOLLOW THE

PROGRAM.

MS. MARTINEZ:

DO I HAVE TO

GO TO JAIL

TODAY?

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. MARTINEZ:

UH-HUH.
YOU CAN'T GIVE ME A COUPLE OF

23

DAYS TO GET THINGS STRAIGHTENED OUT WITH MY CHILDREN,

24

GET THINGS PUT AWAY?

25

THE COURT:

NO, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES

I'M

4

,\C\

1

CONCERNED ABOUT, WHETHER YOU'D BE THERE --.

2

MS. MARTINEZ:

3

ALSO DYING.

4

LIVE.

5

CRIME.

THEY DON'T GIVE HER VERY MUCH TIME TO

I'LL BE BACK.

6

I ALSO HAVE - - M Y MOTHER IS

I'LL DO MY TIME.

THE COURT:

I KNOW I

DID A|

WELL, I'M REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT

7

POTENTIAL RISK OF NOT BEING THERE, GIVEN THE

8

CIRCUMSTANCES AND THEREFORE, I'M GOING TO ORDER YOU --.

9

MR.

CAMPAS:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. CAMPAS:

YOUR HONOR-STATE YOUR NAME.
EDWARD CAMPAS.

I'M HER

12

BROTHER.

13

FILE THE GRIEVANCE AGAINST MR. ALBRIGHT BECAUSE HE HAS

14

BEEN PREJUDICED AGAINST THIS. HE HAS ASKED -- SHE HAS

15

ASKED HIM NOT TO REPRESENT HER.

16

AND YOUR HONOR, I AM THE ONE WHO TOLD HER TO

MR. ALBRIGHT:

THEN SHE WENT AHEAD AND HAD ME

17

REPRESENT HER.

18

THAT'S NOT BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT AT THIS TIME.

19

COURT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT.

20
21

THE COURT:

24
25

THE

IF YOU WANT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE

OF SENTENCING, THAT'S THE ISSUE.

22
23

I OBJECT TO HIM BRINGING ANYTHING UP

MR.

CAMPAS:

I WILL

GRANTEE SHE'LL COME

BACK.

THE COURT:

WELL, IF SHE COMES BACK YOU ARE

GOING TO HAVE I THINK CIRCUMSTANCES.

IN ORDER TO

5

1

PROPERLY SENTENCE YOU IN THE CASE, THE ONLY WAY I'M

2

GOING TO GET INFORMATION IS HAVE THE DIAGNOSTIC AND

3

THEREFORE, TO THE CHARGE OF ROBBERY, WE'RE GOING TO

4

CONTINUE THIS TO JULY 25TH AND I'M GOING TO ORDER YOU

5

COMMITTED TO THE DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS FOR A 60-DAY

6

EVALUATION AND RETURN YOU FOR THE REPORT SO I CAN HAVE

7

INFORMATION NECESSARY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE

8

IN THIS CASE.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15

MS. POTTS: DO YOU WANT THAT INFORMATION TO GO
TO MR. REDD?
THE COURT:

YES.

I'LL HAVE MR. REDD CONTACT

YOU AT THE DIAGNOSTIC.
MR. CAMPAS, YOUR HONOR, IF MY MOTHER DOES
DIE, WILL SHE BE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE FUNERAL.
THE COURT:

WHAT YOU'LL HAVE TO DO DEPENDS

16

ON CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE DIAGNOSTIC PRISON.

17

GOING TO HAVE TO CONTACT MR. REDD AND WE'LL GIVE YOU

18

HIS PHONE NUMBER SO YOU CAN CONTACT HIM AND DETERMINE.

19

YOU ARE

THANK YOU

20
21
22
23
24
25

6
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
\j.~r.:

2

STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,

4

DE"v7; •*?• \"

THE STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 951700140

5
6
7
8

A

--

3

Plaintiff
TRANCRIPT ON APPEAL
-vsJESSE MARIE MARTINEZ,
Defendant

9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on

It

for hearing before the Hon. JON MEMMOTT, Judge of the above

12

entitled Court on July 25, 1995.

13
14

WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the
following testimony was adduced, to wit:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

A p p e a r a n c e s ;
CARVEL HARWARD, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff;
DON S. REDD, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant.

22
23
24
25

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

NOV 3 - 1996
Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

A

, Sh

_

1

"

2

II Mr. Redd here?

3 H

4
5

THE COURT:

State of Utah vs. Jesse Martinez.

Is

This is the time set for sentencing in this matter.

I

received a report from the Department of Corrections based on
|| a 60 day diagnostic they have sent to the Court.

6

you have had an opportunity to review that with Ms. Martinez?

7
8

Mr. Redd,

MR. REDD:
||

THE COURT:

I have, your Honor.
Is there any legal reason why sentence

should not take place at this time?
10

MR. REDD:

11

THE COURT:

There is none, your Honor.
Is there anything you want to present tcf

12

|| the Court before I enter sentence in the matter?

13

II

14

" applications made while this evaluation was going on for

MR. REDD:

Yes, there is. There have been

15

programs that would be designed to aid Ms. Martinez in making

16

the changes she needs to make in her life.

17

places is Parkview.

18

informed me this morning that they have accepted her to that

19

program.

That's an alternative that I didn't notice in the

20

report.

And maybe that information came after the report was

21

prepared.

22

her in an inpatient facility where she would be responsible

23

and also receive the aid she needs

24
25

One of those

And it is an inpatient facility.

And sh^

But there is an alternative for the Court to put

And she would be required to remain there.

She wouldn't

have the option of dropping out because she would be under the!

V£A

1

I Court's control. And it is her desire, and our request

2
3

therefore, that the Court utilize that option rather than the
(I option recommended by the report of remaining incarcerated.

4

THE COURT: May I just ask, usually Diagnostic

5
6

checks all those programs. And that's a program they
|| regularly check. And that's n o t —
MR. REDD: Well, they are the ones that made the

8

recommendation—the application, helped her with the

9

|| application.

10

application.

11

her into that program apparently has come back since the

12

report was prepared.

13

THE COURT:

14
15

18
19

II

MR. REDD:

22
23
24
25

Okay.

Is there anything else you would

She would like to make a statement.

MS. MARTINEZ:

I would just like to say I would lik^

a chance to go to Parkview and see if I can get my life
together there, and get my family back together.

And that's

about all I have to say.

20
21

It is just that the response of acceptance of

like to present to the Court?

16 l!

17

A man by the name of Warner there had made the

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think in terms of the report,

the recommendation is that they felt that there had to be a
long term program.
Parkview.

I am not sure—I am familiar with

I don't think—it is not long term, about two or

three months.

I don't think it is a long term program.

I

think the Court feels given the review and the 60 day

j>

1

diagnostic the Court is going to follow the recommendation o |

2

the Department of Corrections.

3

And that is, to the charge of

aggravated assault, a felony of the first degree, the

4

Defendant is going to be sentenced to the Utah State Prison

5

for an indeterminate period of five years to life; $1,250.00

6

fine, plus a surcharge of 85 percent; there will be no fireanj

7

enhancement or anything with the sentence in this program.

8

Now, if you would like to appeal the sentence the Court

9

has entered, you must make the appeal within 30 days.

10

MR. REDD:

11

Your Honor, there is one other item, if ]j

could mention it to the

12

||

THE COURT:

13

II

MR. REDD:

Court.

Okay
We notice in the report that there is

14

significance applied to the fact that Ms. Martinez does not

15

acknowledge pulling out the gun, pointing it at the victim,

16

and such things as that.

17

placed on her not making the changes she needs to make by her

18

taking that posture.

19

And quite a bit of"credence is

And we are very concerned about that.

She has adamantly maintained that that didn't happen.

20

And the only evidence that I am aware of that is from the

21

victim, who has a record that certainly is more horrendous

22

than hers as far as believability.

23

working with her seem to insist that she acknowledge conduct

24

that she says she didn't commit.

25

Yet the people who are

And if that's one of the

roadblocks in making the progress they want her to make, I

vO^

1

don't know how we get around that.

2
3
4
5
6

THE COURT:

to write a letter to the program people as her counsel and
explain that, and explain the circumstances, it may be
appropriate to do that.

MR. REDD:

8

10

I think that's the best way to

address that

7

9

I think it may be well then if you want

All right, thank you, your Honor.

MR. HARWARD:
record.

Your Honor, just one matter for the

As I listened to the sentence, the Court

inadvertently said aggravated assault.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. HARWARD:

Aggravated robbery.
It is aggravated robbery.
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C E R T I F I C A T E

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

County of Weber

)
)
)

SS:

4
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||

I, James N. Jones, do hereby certify that I am one of th4

6

Official Court Reporters for the State of Utah, and a

7

competent machine shorthand writer,

8

||

That on July 25, 1995, I reported in machine shorthand
the proceedings had and testimony given in the case entitled

10

|| State of Utah vs. Jesse Marie Martinez.

11

That thereafter, I reduced my machine shorthand notes to

12

typewriting, and the foregoing transcript, pages 1 through 5,

13

inclusive, constitutes a full, true and correct transcript of

14

the proceedings had and testimony given at said time and

15

|| place.

16

||

17

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand this 19th
day of October, 1995.
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2S,
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Court Reporter
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23
24
25
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
May 23, 1995

v.
!

Case No. 951700140

JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ,
Defendant.
JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE
Joanne Pratt, Reporter
Kathy Potts, Clerk
This matter comes before the Court for Sentence.

Carvel Harward is present as

counsel for the State of Utah. The defendant is present and represented by William Albright.
Mr. Albright represents that the defendant has filed a complaint against him to the
Utah State Bar. Mr. Cella has a conflict because he represented a co-defendant. Don Redd is
now handling the conflict cases.
The defendant is requesting to withdraw her plea of guilty. The statutory time has
passed.
Mr. Albright makes a motion to withdraw as counsel. The Court grants the motion.
The Court will appoint Don Redd as counsel for the defendant.
The Court will order the defendant into the Division of Corrections for a 60 day
evaluation.
This matter is set for sentencing on July 25, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. The clerk is directed to
notify Mr. Redd of that date.

ADDENDUM D

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER FOR 60 DAY EVALUATION

V.

JESSE MARIE MARTINEZ,

Case No. 951700140
Defendant.

CHARGE: Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the first degree
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of sentence on May 23, 1995.
Plaintiff appeared by and through Carvel R. Harward, County Attorney for Davis County.
Defendant appeared in person and by his attorney, Don Redd, whose office address is 44
North Main Street, Lay ton, Utah, 84041.
There being no legal reason presented to the Court why judgment should not be
pronounced, and it appearing to the Court that imprisonment may be appropriate in this case,
but more detailed information is desirable as a basis for determining the final sentence, than
has been provided by a presentence report.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Defendant is committed to the custody of the Division of Corrections for a
period not exceeding 60 days from date hereof, or for such additional time as the Court may
hereafter grant, not exceeding a further period of 60 days, for a complete study of the
defendant during that time, inquiring into such matters as the defendant's previous
delinquency or criminal experience, his/her social background, his/her capabilities, his/her
mental and emotional and physical health, and the rehabilitative resources or programs which
may be available to suit his/her needs.
2.
On or before the expiration of the period of commitment defendant shall be
returned to the Court for sentencing and a written report of the results of the study, including
whatever recommendations the Division of Corrections believes will be helpful for a proper
resolution of the case, shall be provided to the Court and to counsel not later than 10 days
prior to the time fixed for sentencing.
3.
Unless sooner returned or unless the Court extends the time beyond 60 days as
provided in the preceding paragraph, defendant shall be returned to the Court for sentencing
on the 25th day of July, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.

4.
It is further ordered that the Sheriff of Davis County, Utah , forthwith deliver
the defendant to the Division of Corrections, Diagnostic Unit, Utah State Prison to be held at
the Utah State Prison
Dated at Farmington, Utah, May 23, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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76-3-403
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PUNISHMENTS

crime charged in the information or found in State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App.
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1994).
1991).

(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may be
available to suit his needs.
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by the expiration
of additional commitment time the court may grant, not exceeding a
further period of 90 days, the defendant shall be returned to the court
for sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his
attorney shall be provided with a written diagnostic evaluation report
of results of the study, including any recommendations the Department of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be helpful
to a proper resolution of the case.
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court is supplemental to and becomes a part of the presentence investigation report,
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and recommendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in
accordance with the sentencing alternatives provided under Section
76-3-201.
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this section does
not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any person who is committed
to prison following proceedings under this section shall be given credit against
his sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation
report.

Applicability of 1991 amendment.
Where the trial court had granted defendant's motion under the 1990 version of this
section and entered a conviction for the next
lower category of the offense for which she had
been charged, she was not entitled to a second
reduction after she completed a period of probation because, by that time, the 1991 amendment of this section applied, preventing a second reduction without prosecutorial consent.

^ _± * j • j • J r J *» . ^ ,
C o u r t er ed m r e d u c i n
*
,
* **»<UiiU two fel™* convictions to class A misdemeanor convic* o n s " l 8 t e a d ^ to class B misdemeanor convicj!™ 8 ' ^ / * * * B a g 8 n a w ' 8 3 6 R 2 d 1 3 8 4
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
C i t e d in State v D u
Ct A

1991) United Statefl

1445 (ioth Cir 1991)

8 1 2 R 2 d 6Q ( U u h
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=• 1208(2).

76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against sentence for
misdemeanor.
In any commitment to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense the custodial authority may in its discretion and upon good behavior of the inmate allow
up to ten days' credit against the sentence to be served for every 30 days served
or up to two days' credit for every ten days served when the period to be served
is less than 30 days.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-3-402,1989, ch. 65,ft1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

History: C. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,ft 76-3-404; 1985, ch. 212,ft14;
1989, ch. 245,ft6; 1991, ch. 206,ft5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, assigned the
designations (i) and (iiXA) through (UXE) in
Subsection (lXa), assigned the designations (i)
through (iii) in Subsection (1Kb), inserted ref-

CJJS. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1571.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 1216(1).

(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion imprisonment
may be appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis
for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by
the presentence report, the court may in its discretion commit a
convicted defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 days.
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a complete study
and evaluation of the defendant during that time, inquiring into
matters including:
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and
84

erences to "diagnostic evaluation" and ''evaluation* in Subsections (lXa) and UXb), deleted
The Department of Corrections may contract
with the Utah State Hospital to conduct all or a
portion of that study from Subsection
(lXaXiiXE), inserted Subsection (lXbXii), and
made several stylistic changes throughout Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

76-3-404. Presentence investigation and diagnostic
evaluation — Commitment of defendant — Sentencing procedure.

76-3-404

Discretion of trial court.
Juvenile record.
Rescinding recommendation for evaluation.
Discretion of trial court.
Whether trial judge elects to order an evaluation before passing sentence is within his
discretion; where judge stated, when defendant
appeared before him for sentencing, that he
would refer matter for a 90-day evaluation
whereupon defendant attempted to escape from
the courtroom, it was not an abuse of discretion
forjudge to rescind his recommendation for the
evaluation and proceed to sentence defendant;
the original recommendation, made orally, was
not part of the judgment and was not appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah
1978).
Trial court had discretion to ignore corrections division's request for a second 90-day
diagnostic period in which to determine defendant's suitability for long-term treatment in
sexual offender program and to sentence defen85

dant to prison. State v. Carson, 597 P. 2d 862
(Utah 1979).
The decision to order an additional evaluation lies within the discretion of the trial court,
and unless there is a showing in the record of
an abuse of discretion, the appellate court will
affirm the sentence. State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1
(Utah 1988).
It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to order an evaluation before passing
sentence, and the appellate court will not disturb a sentence unless the record clearly shows
an abuse of that discretion, State v. Russell, 772
P.2d 971 (1989); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1067
(1989).
The law does not compel a trial court to order
a 90-day evaluation merely because it would
have given the judge more information on
which to base the sentence. State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372 (Utah Ct App. 1992).
Juvenile record.
Section 78-3a-44 prohibiting admission of juvenile court record into evidence in proceedings
in any other court does not preclude inclusion of

ADDENDUM F
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77-18-1* Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extensiop —
Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
nth a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
irovided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
lea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the
defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3Xa) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
sdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
Nation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
[6) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
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sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation reportfromthe department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's
family. The victim impact statement shall:
(i) identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4)
by the defendant;
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the
offense upon the victim or the victim'sfamilythat is relevant to the
trial court's sentencing determination.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4).
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation repeat ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are confidential and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or far use by the
department
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support lie i» legally
liable;
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(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
.
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines,
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
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(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facta
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to havq counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence. *
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
•
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in (bankruptcy as
provided in Title 11 U.S.C A. Sec. 623,1986.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and cfui benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2Xg) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(16) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
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disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender,
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-6-406.6.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to liid department in accordance with Subsection (17).
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
,
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History: C. 1*63, 77-18-1, enacted by L. 112,1 17; 1986, ch. 829, ft h 1887, ch, 114,
I960, eh. 16, | 8} 1881,eh. 68, | 2; 11*62, ch. ft 1; 1888, ch. 886, ft 1; 1880, eh. 184, ft 8;
8, ft It 1888, eh. 47, ft 1| 1888, eh. 68, ft 1| 1891,ch.66,| 6; 1881,eh.206,ft 6; 1992.cn.
1983, ch. 86, ft 8; 1884, eh. 20, ft l}1986,ch, 14. ft 8| 1888, ch. 62, ft 7| 1998, eh. 220, ft 8j
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1884, eh. 18, ft 24; 1884, ch. 188, ft 1; 1884,
ch. 280, ft 1; 191*5, ch, 20, ft 146; 1896, ch.
117,ft2; 1996, ch. 184,ft1; 1896, ch. 801,ft8;
1996, ch. 337, ft 11; 1996, ch. 862, ft 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1996, substituted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (6)' for
"Subsections 76-3 201(3) and (4)* in Subsection
(6X0 and replaced "Chapter 1" with Chapter V
in Subsection (16).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1996, added references to "interest in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in
Subsections (6XO, <6Xi). (9Xa), (lOXaXii), and
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3201(3) in Subsection (8Xi), corrected a reference
in Subsection (16), and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 184, effective
May 1, 1996, deleted a requirement of a "recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by
the defendant" in Subsection (6XbXiik rewrote
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic
changes, decressing the time that the presentence investigation must be available before
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccuracies in ths report; and added "and disbursement" after "collection'' in Subsection (9Xa).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 801, effective.

77-18-10

May 1, 1896, substituted "the recommended
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary
damages," inserted "as defined In Subsection
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered"'
in Subsection (6Xa) snd rewrote Subsection (9).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 337, effective
May 1,1996, added "which may include the use
of electronic monitoring" at the and of Subsection (8X0, added Subsections (16) and (17), and
corrected a statutory reference in Subaection
(16).
The 1996 amendment by ch. 362, effective
May 1.1996, inserted "if the defendant is not
represented by counsel* in the first sentence of
Subsection (6% substituted "protected" for "private" and "Chapter (2)"for"Chapter (1)" in the
first sentence of Subsection (16), added Subsection (16Xe), and made related stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislativs Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1996, ch. 184, f
6 directs that the smendmenta in that act to
Subsection (6Xa) of this section snail supersede
the amendments to the same subsection in I*
1996, ch. 362.
Laws 1996, ch. 801, f 6 provides that the
amendments in that act to Subsections (6XbXii)
and (9Xa) supersede the amendments to the
same subsections by ch. 184,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSE

Disclosure to defendant
—Communications between Judge and probation officer.
—Presentence report

curate or unreliable information received during sn ex parte communication with a probation officer that was not disclosed to the
defendant, resentencing may he necessary
8tate v. Gomes, 867 P.2d 868 (Utah 1994X

Disclosure to defendant
—Communications between judge nasi
probation officer.
An ex parte communication between a probation officer snd s sentencing judge, in itself,
does not violate constitutional protections;
however, when s defendant establishes that the
sentencing judge based his sentence upon inac-

Since all of the Information upon which the
sentencing judge relied was disclosed to defendant in the presentence report and at the
sentencing hearings, snd defendant was given
an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of that
information, the defendants right to effective
counsel wss not violated. State v. Gomes, 887
P.2d 663 (Utah 1894).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AJLR. — Who may institute proceedings to
revoke probation, 21 A.L-R6th 276.
Right of convicted defendant or prosecution

to receive updated presentence report at sentencing proceedings, 22 AX.&6U* 660.

77-18-10, Petition — Expungement of records of arrest,
investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing fee.
(1) A person who has been arrested with or without a warrant may petition
the court in which the proceeding occurred or, if there were no court proceed-

